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THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF METAPHYSICAL INQUIRY

A NUMBER of biologists holding to the adequacy of the mechanistic conception in biology have of late expressed views not unlike those clearly and succinctly set forth in the following quotation: "If we consider the organism simply as a system forming a part of external nature, we find no evidence that it possesses properties that may not eventually be satisfactorily analyzed by the methods of physico-chemical science; but we admit also that those peculiarities of ultimate constitution which have in the course of evolution led to the appearance of living beings in nature are such that we can not well deny the possibility or even legitimacy of applying a vitalistic or even biocentric conception to the cosmic process as a whole."[1]

The problems connected with the organism as a part of external nature are referred to in the context of the quotation as scientific problems; those connected with the peculiarities of ultimate constitution as metaphysical. The context also shows that ultimate constitution is conceived in a temporal sense. Metaphysical questions are said to be those having to do with "ultimate origins." Such questions lie quite beyond the application of scientific method. "Why it [nature] exhibits certain apparently innate potentialities and modes of action which have caused it to evolve in a certain way is a question which really lies beyond the sphere of natural science." These "apparently innate potentialities and modes of action" which have caused nature as a whole to evolve in the direction of living beings are identified with "ultimate peculiarities"; and it is with reference to them that the biocentric idea has a possible legitimate application. The argument implies that when we insist upon the adequacy of the physico-chemical explanation of living organisms, we are led, in view of the continuity of evolution of organisms from non-living things, to recognize that the world out of which life developed "held latent or potential within itself the possibility of life." In considering such a

[1] Professor Ralph S. Lillie, *Science*, Vol. 40, page 846. See also the references given in the article, which is entitled "The Philosophy of Biology–Vitalism *vs.* Mechanism."

world and the nature of the potentiality which caused it to evolve living beings, we are forced, however, beyond the limits of scientific inquiry. We pass the boundary which separates it from metaphysics.

Thus is raised the question as to the nature of metaphysical inquiry. I wish to suggest that while one may accept as a preliminary demarcation of metaphysics from science the more "ultimate traits" with which the former deals, it is not necessary to identify these ultimate traits with temporally original traits—that, in fact, there are good reasons why we should not do so. We may also mark off the metaphysical subject-matter by reference to certain irreducible traits found in any and every subject of scientific inquiry. With reference to the theme of evolution of living beings, the distinctive trait of metaphysical reflection would not then be its attempt to discover some temporally original feature which caused the development, but the irreducible traits of a world in which at least some changes take on an evolutionary form. A world where some changes proceed in the direction of the appearance of living and thinking creatures is a striking sort of a world. While science would trace the conditions of their occurrence in detail, connecting them in their variety with their antecedents, metaphysics would raise the question of the sort of world which *has* such an evolution, not the question of the sort of world which causes it. For the latter type of question appears either to bring us to an *impasse* or else to break up into just the questions which constitute scientific inquiry.

Any intelligible question as to causation seems to be a wholly scientific question. Starting from any given existence, be it a big thing like a solar system or a small thing like a rise of temperature, we may ask how it came about. We account for the change by linking up the thing in question with other specific existences acting in determinate ways—ways which collectively are termed physico-chemical. When we have traced back a present existence to the earlier existences with which it is connected, we may ask a like question about the occurrence of the earlier things, viewed as changes from something still earlier. And so on indefinitely; although, of course, we meet practical limits in our ability to push such questions beyond a certain indefinite point. Hence it may be said that a question about ultimate origin or ultimate causation is either a meaningless question, or else the words are used in a relative sense to designate the point in the past at which a particular inquiry breaks off. Thus we might inquire as to the "ultimate" origin of the French language. This would take us back to certain definite antecedent existences, such as persons speaking the Latin tongue, others speaking barbarian tongues; the contact of these peoples in war, commerce, political

administration, education, etc. But the term "ultimate" has meaning only in relation to the particular existence in question: French speech. We are landed in another historic set of existences, having their own specific antecedents. The case is not otherwise if we ask for the ultimate origin of human speech in general. The inquiry takes us back to animal cries, gestures, etc., certain conditions of intercourse, etc. The question is, how one set of specific existences gradually passed into another. No one would think of referring to latent qualities of the Latin speech as the cause of the evolution of French; one tries to discover actual and overt features which, *interacting* with other equally specific existences, brought about this particular change. If we are likely to fall into a different mode of speech with reference to human language in general, it is because we are more ignorant of the specific circumstances under which the transition from animal cries to articulate speech with a meaning took place. Upon analysis, reference to some immanent law or cause which forced the evolution will be found to be a lazy cloak for our ignorance of the specific facts needed in order to deal successfully with the question.

Suppose we generalize the situation still more. We may ask for the ultimate origin of the entire present state of things. Taken *en masse*, such a question is meaningless. Taken in detail, it means that we may apply the same procedure distributively to each and any of the things which now exist. In each case we may trace its history to an earlier state of things. But in each case, *its* history is what we trace, and the history always lands us at some state of things in the past, regarding which the same question might be asked. That scientific inquiry does not itself deal with any question of ultimate origins, except in the purely relative sense already indicated, is, of course, recognized. But it also seems to follow from what has been said that scientific inquiry does not generate, or leave over, such a question for some other discipline, such as metaphysics, to deal with. The contrary conception with respect to the doctrine of evolution is to be explained, I think, by the fact that theology used to have the idea of ultimate origin in connection with creation, and that at a certain juncture it was natural to regard the theory of evolution as a substitute or rival of the theological idea of creation.

If all questions of causation and origin are specific scientific questions, is there any place left for metaphysical inquiry at all? If its theme can not be ultimate origin and causation, is metaphysics anything but a kind of pseudo-science whose illusory character is now to be recognized? This question takes us to the matter of whether there are ultimate, that is, irreducible, traits of the very existences with

which scientific reflection is concerned. In all such investigations as those referred to above we find at least such traits as the following: Specifically diverse existences, interaction, change. Such traits are found in any material which is the subject-matter of inquiry in the natural science. They are found equally and indifferently whether a subject-matter in question be dated 1915 or ten million years B.C. Accordingly, they would seem to deserve the name of ultimate, or irreducible, traits. As such they may be made the object of a kind of inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular group of existences, a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical may be given.[2]

It may well seem as if the fact that the subject-matter of science is always a plurality of diverse interacting and changing existences were too obvious and commonplace to invite or reward investigation. Into this point I shall not go, beyond pointing out, in connection with the present theme, that certain negative advantages in the economizing of intellectual effort would at least accrue from the study. Bare recognition of the fact just stated would wean men from the futility of concern with ultimate origins and laws of causation with which the "universe" is supposed to have been endowed at the outset. For it would reveal that, whatever the date of the subject-matter which may be successfully reflected upon, we have the same situation that we have at present: diversity, specificality, change. These traits have to be begged or taken in any case. If we face this fact without squeamishness we shall be saved from the recurrent attempts to reduce heterogeneity to homogeneity, diversity to sheer uniformity, quality to quantity, and so on. That considerations of quantity and mathematical order are indispensable to the successful prosecution of researches into particular occurrences is a

[2] The name at least has the sanction of the historical designation given to Aristotle's consideration of existence as existence. But it should be noted that we also find in Aristotle the seeds (which, moreover, have at places developed into flourishing growths in his own philosophy) of the conception of metaphysics rejected above. For he expressly gives the more general traits of existence the eulogistic title "divine" and identifies his first philosophy with theology, and so makes this kind of inquiry "superior" to all others, because it deals with the "highest of existing things." While he did not himself seek for this higher or supreme real in time, but rather located it, in its fullness of reality, just beyond space, this identification of existence as such with the divine led to such an identification the moment theology became supremely interested in "creation." But unless one approaches the study of the most general traits of the matter of scientific inquiry with theological presuppositions, there is, of course, no ground for the application to them of eulogistic predicates. There is no ground for thinking that they are any better or any worse, any higher or any lower, than other traits, or that any peculiar dignity attaches to a study of them.

precious fact. It exhibits certain irreducible traits *of* the irreducible traits we have mentioned, but it does not replace them. When it tries to do so it cuts the ground out from under its own feet.

Let me emphasize this point by comment on a further quotation. "If we assume constancy of the elementary natural processes, and constancy in the modes of connection between them—as exact observation forces us to do—there seems no avoiding the conclusion that—given an undifferentiated universe at the start—only one course of evolution can ever have been possible. Laplace long ago perceived this consequence of the mechanistic view of nature, and the inevitability of this conclusion has never been seriously disputed by scientific men. Nevertheless, this is a very strange result, and to many has seemed a *reductio ad absurdum* of the scientific view as applied to the whole of nature."

Note that the inevitable conclusion as to the predetermined course of evolution and the apparent incredibility of the conclusion both depend upon the premise "given an undifferentiated universe at the start." Now this is precisely a premise which a scientific view can not admit, for science deals with any particular existence only by tracing its occurrence to a plurality of prior changing interacting things. Any Laplacean formula would, in any case, be a formula for the structure of *some* existence *in* the world, not for the world as a "whole." The scientific grounds which make it impossible to take the world *en masse* at the present time and to give a comprehensive formula for it in its entirety apply even more strongly, if possible, to some earlier state of affairs. For such a formula can be reached only by tracing back a specific present phenomenon to its specific antecedents.

A curious illusion exists as to formulæ for the ancient states of nature. It is frequently assumed that they denote not merely some absolute original (which is impossible), but also one from which later events unroll in a mathematically predetermined fashion. We seem to be passing in a one-sided way from the earlier to the later. The illusion vanishes when we ask where the formula came from. How was it obtained? Evidently, by beginning with some present existence and tracing its earlier course, till at some time (relevant to the object of the inquiry) we stop and condense the main features of the course into a formula for the structure of the state of things at the date where we stop. Instead of really deducing or deriving the course of subsequent events from an original state, we are simply taking out of a formula the traits which we have put into it on the basis of knowledge of subsequent events. Let the present state be anything you please, as different as may be from what is actually

found, and it will still be true that we could (theoretically) construct a comprehensive formula for its earlier estate. In short, as a matter of fact, a Laplacean formula merely summarizes what the actual course of events has been with respect to some selected features. How then can it be said to describe an original state of nature in virtue of which just such and such things have necessarily happened? A statement that the world is thus and so can not be tortured into a statement of how and why it must be as it is. The account of how a thing came to be as it is always starts and comes back to the fact that it *is* thus and so. How then can this fact be derived according to some law of predestination from the consideration of its own prior history? For, I repeat, this history is *its* history.[3]

This discussion, however, oversimplifies matters. It overlooks the extent to which inference as to a prior state of affairs is dependent upon the diversity and complexity of what is now observed. We should be in a hard case in trying to fix upon the structure of the Latin language if our sole datum were, say, the French language. As matter of fact, in considering the growth of the French tongue we have other Romance languages to fall back upon. Above all, we have independent evidence as to the characteristics of Latin speech. If we had not, we should be reasoning in a circle. Science is rightly suspicious of accounts of things in terms of a hypothesis for whose existence nothing can be alleged save that if it existed it would or might account for something which is actually found. Independent evidence of the existence of such an object is required. This consideration has an interesting application to the question in hand. It brings out clearly the absurdity involved in supposing that any formula, of the Laplacean type, about some earlier state of existence, however comprehensive, is comprehensive enough to cover the whole scope of existence of that earlier time.

Let us suppose the formula to be descriptive of a primitive state of the solar system. Not only must it start from and be framed in terms of what *now* exists, but the present datum must be larger than the existing solar system if we are to escape reasoning in a circle. In such cosmological constructions, astronomers and geologists rely upon observation of what is going on outside of the solar system. Without such data, the inquiry would be hopelessly crippled. The stellar field now presents, presumably, systems in all stages of formation. Is there any reason for supposing that a like state of affairs did not present itself at any and every prior time? Whatever for-

[3] Compare Woodbridge, "Evolution," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 21, page 137.

mula is arrived at for the beginning of our present solar system describes, therefore, only one structure existing amid a vaster complex. A state of things adequately and inclusively described by the formula would be, by conception, a state of things in which nothing could happen. To get change we have to assume other structures which interact with it, existences not covered by the formula.

As a matter of fact, the conception of a solar system seems to have exercised an hypnotic influence upon Newton's successors. The gathering together of sun, planets and their satellites, etc., into a system which might be treated as an individual having its own history was a wonderful achievement, and it impressed men's imaginations. It served for the time as a kind of symbol of the "universe." But as compared with the entire stellar field, the solar system is, after all, only a "right little, tight little island." Yet unless its complex context be ignored the idea of "an undifferentiated universe" which, by some immanent potential force, determined everything which has happened since, could hardly arise.[4] That the French language did not evolve out of Latin because of some immanent causality in the latter we have already noted. It is equally true that the contact and interaction of those speaking Latin with those speaking barbaric tongues were not due to the fact that they spoke Latin, but to independent variables. Internal diversity is as much a necessity as something externally heterogeneous.[5]

The consideration throws light, I think, upon the meaning of potentiality with reference to any state of things. We never apply the term except where there *is* change or a process of becoming. But we have an unfortunate tendency to conceive a fixed state of affairs and then appeal to a latent or potential something or other to effect change. But in reality the term refers to a characteristic of change. Anything changing might be said to exhibit potentiality with respect to two facts: first, that the change exhibits (in connection with interaction with new elements in its surroundings) qualities it did not show till it was exposed to them and, secondly, that the changes in which these qualities are shown run a certain course. To say that an apple has the potentiality of decay does not mean that it has latent or im-

[4] One who turns to Spencer's chapter on the "Instability of the Homogeneous" will perceive that his proof of its instability consists in showing that it was really already heterogeneous.

[5] Some contemporary metaphysical theories attempt to start from pure "simple" entities and then refer change exclusively to "complexes." This overlooks the fact that without internal diversification in the alleged simple entity, a complex entity would no more exhibit change than a simple one. The history of the doctrine of atoms is instinctive. Such a metaphysics transgresses the conditions of intelligent inquiry in exactly the same way as the metaphysics of ultimate origins.

plicit within it a causal principle which will some time inevitably display itself in producing decay, but that its existing changes (in interaction with its surroundings) will take the form of decay, *if* they are exposed or subjected to certain conditions not now operating upon them. Potentiality thus signifies a certain limitation of present powers, due to the limited number of conditions with which they are in interaction plus the fact of the manifestation of new powers under different conditions. To generalize the idea, we have to add the fact that the very changes now going on have a tendency to expose the thing in question to these different conditions which will call out new modes of behavior, in other words, further changes of a different kind. Potentiality thus implies not merely diversity, but a progressively increasing diversification of a specific thing in a particular direction. So far is it from denoting a causal force immanent within a homogeneous something and leading it to change.

We may say then that an earlier condition of our earth was potential with life and mind. But this means that it was changing in a certain way and direction. Starting where we must start, with the present, the fact or organization shows that the world is of a certain kind. In spots, it *has* organization. Reference to the evolution of this organization out of an earlier world in which *such* organization was not found, means something about that earlier condition—it means that it was characterized by a change having direction—that is, in the direction of vital and intelligent organization. I do not see that this justifies the conclusion that that earlier world was biocentric or vitalistic or psychic. Yet two conclusions seem to follow. One is negative. The fact that it is possible and desirable to state the processes of an organized being in chemico-physical terms does not eliminate, but rather takes for granted whatever peculiar features living beings have. It does not imply that the distinguishing features of living and thinking beings are to be explained away by resolution into the features found in non-living things. It is the *occurrence* of these pecular features which is stated in physico-chemical terms. And, as we have already seen, the attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and irreducible existence of the thing dealt with. A statement of the mechanism of vital and thinking creatures is a statement of *their* mechanism; an account of their production is an account of *their* production. To give such an account does not prove whether the existence in question is a good thing or a bad thing, but it proves nothing at all if it puts in doubt the specific existence of the subject-matter investigated.

The positive point is that the evolution of living and thinking beings out of a state of things in which life and thought were not

found is a fact which must be recognized in any metaphysical inquiry into the irreducible traits of the world. For evolution appears to be just one of the irreducible traits. In other words, it is a fact to be reckoned with in considering the traits of diversity, interaction, and change which have been enumerated as among the traits taken for granted in all scientific subject-matter. If everything which is, is a changing thing, the evolution of life and mind indicates the nature of the changes of physico-chemical things and therefore something about those things. It indicates that as purely physical, they are still limited in their interactions; and that as they are brought into more and complex interactions they exhibit capacities not to be found in an exclusively mechanical world. To say, accordingly, that the existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which the situation calls for. But it does not signify that the world "as a whole" is vital or sentient or intelligent. It is a remark of the same order as the statement that one is not adequately acquainted with water or iron until he has found it operating under a variety of different conditions, and hence a scientific doctrine which regards iron as essentially hard or water as essentially liquid is inadequate. Without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say, not that matter *caused* life, but that matter under certain conditions of highly complicated and intensified interaction is living. With the doctrine of evolution, we can add to this statement that the interactions and changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex and intensified interaction which is life. The doctrine of evolution implies that this holds good of any matter, irrespective of its date, for it is not the matter of 1915, as caused by matter that has now ceased to be, which lives. The matter which was active ten million years ago now lives: this is a feature of the matter of ten million years ago.

I am, however, getting beyond my main point. I am not concerned to develop a metaphysics; but simply to indicate one way of conceiving the problem of metaphysical inquiry as distinct from that of the special sciences, a way which settles upon the more ultimate traits of the world as defining its subject-matter, but which frees these traits from confusion with ultimate origins and ultimate ends—that is, from questions of creation and eschatology. The chief significance of evolution with reference to such an inquiry seems to be to indicate that while metaphysics takes the world irrespective of any particular time, yet time itself, or genuine change in a specific direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of the world irrespective of date.

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RELATION OF RACE TO THOUGHT EXPRESSION

WEBSTER defines race as "A division of mankind possessing constant traits, transmissible by descent, sufficient to characterize it as a distinct and permanent type of the genus *homo*."

In general, race classification has been based upon purely physical characteristics—many authorities virtually deny that there is any marked mental distinction between races. Of these physical characteristics the most important and generally recognized are skin-color, form of hair, and shape of skull, particularly the cephalic index and facial angle. The number of races so distinguished must, of course, vary according to how marked a distinction is required to justify classification as a separate race. Quatrefarges recognizes only three races: Caucasic, Ethiopic, and Mongolic. That other races distinct from any now existing have lived in prehistoric times is universally admitted (for example, the man of Neanderthal). Whether all men descended from a common ancestor or not is an open question, and one of no great interest for us. It is sufficient to know that beyond all doubt racial distinctions fully as marked as at present antedate the ice age. These old races were not, however, so far as can be shown, the direct ancestors of any modern races. In other words, *all* modern races are unquestionably blends. Quatrefarges shows conclusively that blending of races began in Europe as far back as the time of the cave-men. These blends form the bases for all modern races and peoples.

The physical basis for race classification given above seems to the writer to be both one-sided and inadequate. Races and peoples differ quite as much in their mental as in their physical make-up; though these differences are more subtle and more easily hidden by training and education. Most writers are inclined to treat mental race distinctions rather lightly, in general explaining away the facts by saying that the so-called racial differences are really only differences between individuals, and that individuals of any race can easily be found exhibiting those characteristics said to be typical of any other race; or if this does not seem to fit the facts it is said that environment and not race is the true cause of mental differences, that certain peoples are more voluble, suggestible, or what not than others simply because of physical and social surroundings. It is said, for example, that many Englishmen are as excitable as Frenchmen, and that some of the most phlegmatic of men are Frenchmen, that the negro race has produced such men as Dubois and Booker Washington, and the Anglo-Saxon race many a stupid blockhead. The following is a fair illustration of the second contention: The

sunny climate, language, and traditions of the Italians make them differ mentally from the North-Germans with their gloomy climate, guttural language, and somber traditions; that if the Germans could be transplanted into Italy, and the Italians into Germany, leaving customs, language, and traditions behind them, but yet carrying their blood intact, their mental traits would be completely exchanged.

Without denying the importance of climate, custom, language, or tradition, and also admitting that isolated individuals tend to become more like the surrounding race than like their own race, mentally speaking (psychological mass action law), we may state that mental states are in a very large degree dependent upon cerebral structure, and that there is no more reason for denying the importance of cerebral structure as a basis for race qualification than there is for denying that of facial angle—both are purely physiological (or in the last analysis physical). This must not be taken to mean that mind is a "product" of the brain, but that there is a close parallelism between neural structure and mental activity, can hardly be doubted in the light of the facts of physiological psychology.

There are some who, emphasizing the quality of mind and matter, argue that similarity of cerebral structure in no way implies similarity of mental characteristics. For them it is idle to classify mentality on the basis of brain structure, even if we knew the details of such structure, for the one is mental and the other physical. To this we can only answer that the hypothesis: "No psychosis without neurosis" is about as well established in psychology as is Avogadro's hypothesis in physics; in the nature of the case neither can ever be *proved.* If, however, we accept this very probable hypothesis, we can hardly doubt that for every thought there is a corresponding brain-process (physico-chemical process) and for every *tendency* to think in a particular way there is a corresponding cerebral structure. The only real question then remaining will be, is cerebral structure alike for all races at birth and changed afterwards by environment only, or do races like individuals innately differ in the make-up and arrangement of the nerve cells constituting the brain? To the writer the latter seems the more probable.

The differences in mental capacity depend on physiological differences which are at present unknown. That is, just those differences which would be most significant as the physiological bases for mental and moral differences are those that are not known. It is to be hoped that this will not always be so. To prove mental differences to be physiological would necessitate the discovery of specific differences in nerve structure corresponding to differences which are now alleged to be the result of environment. Since such physio-

logical knowledge has not yet been attained we must attack the problem from the psychological side.

Those who view man as forming but one race mentally point out that an anatomist can not with certainty tell if a given brain belonged to a white man or to a negro, much less if to an Englishman or to a Frenchman. This is true, but it is also true, that given a considerable number of brains from ordinary whites, and another collection of negro brains he will never have trouble in distinguishing which group is which. The same might be said of some of the more grossly physical distinctions between the races. Thus individual Japanese may be found who differ less from individual Americans than they do from certain individual Japanese, either mentally or physically, and individual Americans may be found having more resemblance to individual Japanese than to certain other Americans; yet mentally and physically there is always a marked distinction between a hundred Japanese and a hundred Americans that never leaves us in doubt as to which group is which.

This I believe would apply to babies as well as to adults, and to the mental productions of groups as well as to their physical persons. Thus, from a purely empirical point of view, the occasional appearance of persons of one race mentally or physically more like those of another race than their own is no bar to a successful classification. For example, the existence of phlegmatic Frenchmen and of excitable Englishmen does not invalidate the mental distinction between Frenchmen and Englishmen. We shall later see that these apparent exceptions are to be expected if we admit the soundness of mental race distinctions.

However few or many may have been the original number of races, it is, as has already been stated, quite certain that *all* modern races and peoples without exception are more or less *blends*. This statement is not contrary to the well-known Mendelian law of heredity. Superficially viewed this law may seem to deny the possibility of permanent "blends," since all unit characters must reappear as such in fixed mathematical proportions. But a strictly mathematical consideration of this law will also show that when the number of such unit characters is moderately large, the probability of having all of them (or a large majority) reappear in any one individual becomes vanishingly small. In fact the reappearance of a large number of such characters becomes mathematically less probable as the number of total characters increases.

Man is the most complex of animals, physically and mentally, and there is every reason to believe that the number of physical unit characters, properly so called, reaches into the thousands. The brain of man is complex beyond possibility of description; there are

literally hundreds of millions of neurones and numberless possibilities of connections more or less determined at birth. The number of unit mental characters can not, therefore, be even estimated with any degree of satisfaction. While theoretically the same, the case is practically very different from that of peas or mice. Now a consideration of the physics and mathematics of the case will show that when the number of determinants is infinite *the result of a cross in accordance with the Mendelian law becomes identical with a blend.* This is exactly analogous to the principle in physics that if the number of molecules of water, say, be infinite we may apply the laws of perfect fluids without error. Of course, the number of determinants is not infinite, nor is the number of water molecules, and hence the result of a cross between races is not a perfect *blend.* This may, at least in part, explain the great individual differences noted above between persons of the same race. In fact, the number of unit characters seems small enough in many cases for us to trace the workings of the Mendelian law and to allow for those cases commonly called "reversion of type"; and yet large enough to allow for an approximately homogeneous people to result after a comparatively few generations, say eight or ten. It is to be noted that such a people are *never* completely homogeneous, but tend to become more and more so with time if "castes" are not formed within the "blend."

By *mental-set* is meant the tendency to react in certain ways in response to a given situation. It is not exactly synonymous with ways of reacting, but rather means the ways one should react if it were not for extraneous influences. The German word *Weltanschauung* conveys something of the thought that is desired, and yet that is not it. We might say that the *Weltanschauung* of a person or people is chiefly determined by mental-set.

There are always three factors that go to make up mental-set, heredity, environment, and time. Of these the first two can vary independently of each other. Time has no meaning here except that heredity and environment may vary with respect to it. This may be expressed mathematically thus:

$$\text{MENTAL-SET} = \int \text{HEREDITY}\ dt. + \int \text{ENVIRONMENT}\ dt.$$

For the individual heredity is *fixed,* a constant that can not be changed, therefore, for this case:

$$\text{MENTAL-SET} = K + \text{ENVIRONMENT}\ dt.$$

For a people, however, heredity may change quite as rapidly as environment, in fact, usually more so, and it is in all cases a more powerful factor. Hence we see that heredity is more important for

the race than for the individual. LeBon expresses this by saying, "The only force strong enough to compete with heredity is heredity." Let us repeat, that for the individual mental-set is determined by the *fixed* quantity *heredity,* plus *environment* which varies with time; while for a *people* mental-set is determined by *heredity* and *environment,* both of which vary as time passes.

For a people heredity is immensely more important than environment for two reasons; *first,* its effects (on mental-set) are more rapid and marked, *second,* the changes produced by heredity are of necessity passed on to future generations, which may or may not be true of the effects of environment.

The fact that peoples differ in mental-set must not be taken to mean that one is necessarily better or worse, higher or lower, than the other. This is chiefly a question of viewpoint. I shall try to show that the mental set of the Frenchman and the German is radically different, but it does not follow that one is better or more intellectual than the other. The same is true of the American and the Japanese, or of the American white man and the American negro. That they differ mentally in the most important manner I believe we can show; which is the best or highest is largely a question of the point of view.

Thought can not be transferred; it can only be expressed. There is no known way by means of which I can communicate my thought to you, and when we speak of doing so it is purely figurative. What I can do, and all that can be done, is to give such *expression to* my thought as may cause similar thoughts in others. This is never perfectly accomplished, and in many cases the thought thus awakened is very different from the thought expressed. However, it is only through thought *expression* that we can know anything of the mental-set of individuals or races, and so we must look to thought expression for confirmation or contradiction of our thesis *that peoples and races have inherently different mental-sets.* In a broad sense all acts of men are expressions of thought, actual or potential, that is, of mental-set; but for our purpose only certain forms of expression are important:

These are: (1) Spoken language, (2) literature, (3) political and social institutions, (4) material civilization, (5) religion.

Beginning with spoken language, we must remember that thought, perhaps, is possible without words, though undoubtedly in all cases thought without words would be much narrowed and cramped.[1] The importance of the form of expression, here language of every-day life, spoken or written, in molding thought itself is immense; it is

[1] See James's "Principles of Psychology," Vol. I., page 226.

probably the most potent part of *environment*. The individual can hardly escape having his mental-set remodeled to fit the language through which he must express his thoughts. The race, however, having more time, can, and does, remodel the language to fit its mental-set (being also somewhat changed in the process, of course). Some examples may be cited: through what may be called political accident what is now France adopted the Latin language. After the fall of the Roman Empire the population of this country became very heterogeneous, but gradually formed something of what we may term a quasi-homogeneous people. The language imposed upon them by accident had now become a sort of "Low Latin" unsuitable for the expression of the thought of the new people now slowly forming by fusion of the heterogeneous elements. Unconsciously, little by little, inflections and constructions were adopted, till to-day French is Latin only in its word-roots and not in its structure or spirit. Something similar happened in Italy and Spain,—each people slowly fitting the language to the genius of the race, or its mental-set. In Germany where the race did not undergo any great change of blood, the language remains essentially unaltered in structure and spirit to this day. Remember that we are not talking of mere word-roots, but of structure, inflection, endings, manner of compounding, and so forth. These and not word-roots are the real spirit of a language.

In England prior to the Norman Conquest, we find a Teutonic tongue spoken, but with the introduction of considerable quantities of Norman blood this language was no longer suited to the mental-set of the people. As a new people gradually formed, so a new language formed, suited to them. In this case the old Saxon word-roots were largely retained, just as were the Latin word-roots in France, but, as in that case, the spirit of the older language was completely lost. Inflections were dropped, structures were changed, and in general, the language was made to conform to the people who spoke it. It is a matter of common observation that many obsolete Teutonic forms or ways of pronouncing words continue among ignorant persons in rural districts in England and America. It is customary to attribute this to ignorance and illiteracy, but is this correct? If this were the only factor would not the language of the illiterate always change more rapidly than that of the educated? May it not be that those persons being of humbler descent are more Teutonic, *i. e.*, less Norman, in blood, and that these forms suit them? The formation of a new language is not necessitated simply by the need of uniformity in expression; but the play of imagination, fancy, and instinctive needs of the people lead them deliberately, though

perhaps unconsciously, to change an accidentally imposed language to suit the genius of the race.

Noting again that two factors (other than time) help to make a people or race, is it not true that in spite of the unifying influence of universal education, newspapers, and travel, Americans are developing a new variation of English suited to the mental-set of the people? In spite of the fact that the American negro is subjected to every form of artificial coercion to force him to speak English just as the white man does, he does not do it. I am not referring to mere broken English; that is just as incorrect as Negro-English, but it is very different. Few of us realize how different Negro-English is from the white man's English. In truth it is a different medium of expression from English, in which the same words convey entirely different thoughts in entirely different ways. This in spite of the fact that forces such as suggestion, imitation, and education, tend to make the language the same for both races.

Man's permanent written expression of thought is a quite different thing from his spoken language. It is not representative of so large a proportion of a people, being rather an expression of the best than of the average thought. Yet it is no less distinctive and characteristic of a people; each writer has his own style, but, *"Le style est de l'homme même,"* is no more true for an individual than for the race or people. Entirely aside from the mere words used there is a something common to all or nearly all German novels that marks them off from English or French of the same period, and this something does not disappear even if all are translated into a common tongue. Further, this national style, or style of a people, is not easily changed. Literary fashions come and go, but that of which we here speak remains. If, through accident, a foreign style gains temporary ascendency in the literature of a people, their literature always declines. Even if the literature copied be very strong and noble, that of the imitating people rings untrue and is never great. This is because it does not allow expression to what has been called in this paper the mental-set of a people. It is on this account that no people have ever produced really worthy literature till they shook off the trammels of foreign or classic style. Not only must an individual writer be true to himself, that is, exhibit what Lewes calls "The principle of sincerity," if he would write literature worth while, but so must a people. One people can not adopt the style of another, but only imitate it, because the essence of style is that it shall express the mental set of the individual or people. *"Le style est de l'homme même."*

The mental set of a people also finds expression in political, social, and educational institutions. It is usual to explain the admitted

national character of most of these institutions on the ground of environment and practical requirements. The fact is that these material factors have weight only as they influence what we have called the mental-set of a people; and as has already been pointed out this is influenced as much (or more) by heredity as by environment. Imitation and artificial education have, of course, some influence, as, for example, the "republics" of Spanish America call themselves such in imitation of the United States of America, but this influence is always external and often transitory. If we look beneath the surface we see that no Spanish-speaking country is a republic in the sense that the United States is, nor can it be so. It is usual to explain that with time these or any other peoples, will become "fitted for self-government." This I believe to be a delusion and in contradiction to the observed facts and laws of physiological psychology. The gray matter making up the brain of, say, the Spanish American peoples is different from that of the Englishman. This does not necessarily imply inferiority, any more than black eyes imply inferiority as compared with blue eyes. *But it does imply difference.* This should always be remembered in discussing such matters; we Americans are prone to believe that ours is the only form of government that is highly intelligent, and therefore we are inclined to look upon the statement that a people are not suited for self-government as a slur upon their intellectual ability. This we try to salve by saying that with education and development they will become competent to govern themselves as we govern ourselves. Something of this kind is constantly being said of the Filipinos, Mexicans, Cubans, and others.

Let us see the facts without regard to the *names* by which institutions are called. Also let us disabuse our minds of the notion that a republic is the only good form of government. The governments of all the English-speaking countries are essentially republics of the same general type. This is true of England and her great colonies, as well as of America. France is a true republic in the sense that it is neither a military despotism nor an hereditary monarchy; yet the political institutions of France differ more from those of the United States than do those of England. As the French republic is the only great nation of French people, so we find no other people whose political institutions are so nearly allied to those of France as are the institutions of, say, Canada and the United States. Again we find a certain similarity in the political and social institutions of all dolichocephalic (Teutonic) peoples of Europe, whether called by the name of republic, empire, kingdom, or what not. The French Empire of the first or second Napoleon was an entirely different institution

from the present German Empire, even though having many factors in common.

In Spanish America, in spite of the name "republic" by which all of the states are called, we know that none is a republic in the sense in which the United States is. In Spanish America the most stable form of government seems to be the military dictatorship under the guise of a republic. Of course, all are not alike, for they differ in blood as well as in name; some are orderly strong governments, while others are weak and chaotic ones; but none is a republic. The naïve statement often seen in school books that a republic is a government deriving its authority from the consent of the people is meaningless, for in a very true sense all governments do this. That is, a nation can not be governed by a small number of men if the people as a whole actively and persistently oppose such a government. However, a people may very willingly *consent* to a government without themselves being any active or actual factor in that government. This is the true distinction, and not the mere name kingdom, empire, or republic. There are as many varieties of governments as there are peoples to be governed, each being an expression of the mental-set of a people.

If a so-called nation be in the formative state, racially speaking, that is, if, instead of being one homogeneous people, it is a mixture of several peoples yet unblended, no stable form of government is possible (excepting, of course, military rule from without). This seems to have been the case in Italy in the past, and in Spanish America, or at least parts of it, to-day; and probably will be the case in certain American states having a large foreign population in the future.

Other institutions, such as systems of education and social systems, might be similarly discussed. If the peculiar nature of institutions is to be explained by environment, one has to postulate something hereditary which was the dominant factor in forming the environment; for the environment that is of most importance here is not climate and geographical position, but customs and traditions.

Let us now briefly consider the material civilization of a people as a means of thought expression. It is true that material civilization is only the "hull" of thought, yet it is *par excellence* the "outward and visible form" of the inward thought. It is usual to assume that any given material civilization is founded upon another and older civilization. That is, that all civilization is a process of borrowing and improving, not of outright originating of anything. Through suggestion or imitation as well as through force of arms peoples do imitate or take on the material civilization of other peoples; but the real foundation of each material civilization is not another and older

civilization, but the minds of the people. The popular notion that so-called inferior civilizations are only stages of progress towards a civilization like our own is without foundation. Civilizations do progress, but not all towards a common goal. There is no reason to believe that the Hottentot would ever evolve railroads or skyscrapers, or anything serving the same purpose if he were allowed millions of years in which to evolve. Not only in such extreme cases is this true, but peoples on an intellectual par, in the sense that one can not be said to be *superior* to the other, will never evolve similar civilizations unless they have similar mentality, that is, are closely akin. Though the Romans and Etruscans were of about equal intellectual rank and had practically identical physical environment, and though the Romans evidently *tried* to copy the Etruscan architecture they never succeeded; there always remained a something that differentiated the work of the two peoples. Something similar might be said of Roman and Greek material civilization. Even to-day with our universal intercommunication there is a distinct and characteristic difference between the material civilizations of the important peoples, civilized or uncivilized, that extends throughout the whole shell of outward civilization. This, too, in spite of all kinds of artificial devices to smooth out just these inequalities. This could be illustrated equally well by the architecture of London and New York, of Mexico and Texas, of Peru and Australia; or by styles of railroad coaches in the various countries. This does not deny that material civilization, like language, is in part borrowed; but it does show that any given material civilization is not merely a step in a series of civilizations through which all races normally pass.

Of all forms of racial thought expression religion is at once the most intangible and most characteristic. Carlyle well says, "If you tell me what a man's true belief is, you tell me to a very great extent what the man is, and what kind of things he will do. Of a man or of a *nation* we inquire, therefore, first of all, what religion they had?"

Religion is peculiarly racial. What men do and say about business is perhaps largely determined by immediate surroundings. What men believe of the future and past, of life and death, are matters of "temperament" or racial-set. Of course, individuals may be found who diverge from the rule for one reason or another, but such are exceptions.

It is often stated that Christianity is a Semitic religion adopted by Non-Semitic peoples. This is argued to show that we obtained our religion from Asia, and that, therefore, in spreading Christianity in the East we are only returning borrowed capital. It may be true that historically speaking, Christianity is of Semitic and, therefore, of Asiatic origin; but psychologically speaking Christianity is

neither Semitic nor Asiatic. If we accept the records of the new Testament we can not help seeing that Christianity even in its infancy was not in accord with Jewish mental-set. And if this was true at the beginning, how much more so after it had been accepted and transformed by western minds? (The founder of Christianity was probably one of those great minds not in accord with his own people or times, that is, what the biologists call a *sport*.) One of the strongest proofs that Christianity is Non-Semitic is the fact that in spite of environment no Semitic people have ever been induced to accept it. The Semitic mind seems to require a strictly monotheistic religion, and this they find in Judaism or Mahometanism. On the contrary, the occidental peoples insist on a concrete, practical religion, and this they find in Christianity. The more typical of the oriental peoples, or at least the cultured among them, do not long for the concrete expression of religious belief that western peoples do. Logical philosophical speculation appeals to their mental-set—hence Buddhism and Brahmanism. It is noteworthy that after twenty centuries of effort, Christianity has scarcely made an impression in the east. The handful of native oriental Christians is absolutely negligible in comparison with the vast number who still give expression to their religious thoughts through adherence to some of the several eastern religions. On the other hand neither Mahometanism nor any other eastern religion has ever made headway among western peoples. Their total following is negligible. How are these facts to be explained? We sometimes say that eastern religions are incomprehensible to us and our religion to the orientals. This is true. For a religion to be genuine it must be the most subtle expression of the inward mentality; and the mentalities of eastern and of western peoples are widely different.

In fact we may venture to say that if ever the east becomes Christian it will be with an orientalized form of Christianity, being like our Christianity in name only. A good illustration of the point was given in the proposal made in Japan some time back, to *create* a new religion by blending Buddhism, Shinto, and Christianity to suit the Japanese people. Of course such a scheme is not likely to succeed in this way—time must be given for a people naturally and unconsciously to blend these or other beliefs in such proportions and ways as may suit their mental-set. This can not be done artificially. It may be remarked that the Japanese are not a truly oriental people in the sense that the Chinese are.

Though all occidental peoples unquestionably resemble each other more than they do any oriental people, yet they are divided into more or less well-marked groups. In order not to extend this discussion to too great a length we must confine ourselves to the larger divi-

sions and ignore all minor ones, though these would equally well illustrate our point. Broadly speaking, the religions of Europe and America may be divided into three classes on psychological grounds: (1) Religions having a tangible head, emphasizing faith; (2) individualistic and intellectual religions, emphasizing freedom of belief; (3) emotional religions, emphasizing personal experience.

While all Christian religions possess to some extent all of these qualities, the emphasis is quite different. The Roman and Greek churches are the important examples of the first class given above; Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Puritans may serve as examples of the second class; Baptists and Methodists are usually representatives of the third class. Of course all overlap.

If we make a list of the countries in which the decided majority of the people profess a religion of class one, that is, Roman and Greek Catholic countries, we will find them all peopled by Celtic or Slavonic races. Such a list of countries for the second class of religions will include Teutonic peoples only (using that term in a broad historic sense corresponding to physical formation of the head and face), and the more Teutonic in blood the more *protestant* in the full, non-emotional sense is their religion. Ireland is an example of a brachycephalic people who through political accident speak a modified Teutonic language and who are united with a Protestant people, yet they are as Catholic as the people of Spain or Italy with whom they have more racial kinship. The same relation holds for the Scotch Highlanders in so far as their blood remains predominantly Celtic. When for any reason a people have adopted a religion foreign to their mental-set we find that they adapt it to suit their own mentality, just as they do language or material civilization. For example, the Welsh, though Protestant, have an emotional form of Protestantism which, psychologically speaking, is more akin to Romanism than to Lutheranism. Our southern negroes furnish another example of fitting a religion to a race. It is a fact perfectly well known to all who are familiar with negro religions, that these religions, though called by the same names, have scarcely any points in common with the religions of the whites.

This one mode of thought expression is so varied and important that whole books could be written on race and religion; but we have only attempted to touch upon some of the more important and obvious relations.

The effect of crossing or interbreeding two dissimilar races is very different from the point of view of the *individuals* produced, and that of the *race* or people produced. An individual resulting from a cross of dissimilar races may be mentally superior (or inferior) to either. When a large number of such persons exist in a country

social, political, religious, and all other institutions must be in a state of unstable equilibrium, for none of the existing institutions, which were fitted to the mental-set of the parent races, *can* fit that of the new and as yet heterogeneous race. For such blending of races as is necessary to produce a homogeneous people several generations at least are required; and then perhaps several more generations will be needed to enable the "members" of the race to find themselves, so to speak, that is, to adapt to their own mentality the customs and institutions that they have inherited.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Essays on Truth and Reality. F. H. BRADLEY. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1914. Pp. xvi + 480.

Mr. Bradley has here collected the principal articles that appeared from his pen during the years 1908–11, with a few others of earlier date and some fresh additions. These last include a note on pragmatism, a criticism of James's radical empiricism, a criticism of Mr. Russell's theory of relations, and several short constructive papers: "What is the real Julius Caesar?," "On God and the Absolute," and "On my Real World."

As Mr. Bradley himself repeatedly indicates, the volume contains little by way of development or even of amplification of his already published views. It consists of criticisms and restatements. Those who have studied "Appearance and Reality" have little to learn from it with regard to Mr. Bradley's philosophy. The interest of this new work is that of an historical document. Mr. Bradley is, with one possible exception, the most distinguished representative of absolute idealism in England; and his philosophical activity covers the whole period of the dominance of the neo-Hegelian school. These essays mark another "milestone." They show us the reaction of a leader of the eighties and nineties upon the newer thought-impulses of to-day. This applies not only to the critical papers, but also to the constructive. These latter are fresh attempts to make plain the old and well-tried doctrines to a generation of would-be innovators.

Of the critical papers the most successful appear to be those directed against James, convicting him of vagueness and inconsistency, as well as of ignorance of various neo-Hegelian positions. Of positive appreciation there is none. Professor Dewey is gingerly handled. Mr. Bradley has evidently a deep respect for him, perhaps as a representative of the Hegelian tradition; and his criticisms usually shade off into a confession of possible misunderstanding. Least successful, I should say, is the new essay in criticism of Mr. Bertrand Russell. This is in part directed against the contention of Mr. Russell that relations are real apart from all terms. Mr. Bradley appeals to an "ideal experiment," in which he

removes the terms from different relations; and declares that when the terms are wholly removed the relation has in every case disappeared. A fair parallel would be an experimental refutation of Platonism that consisted in showing that pure "ideas" can not be represented in imagination. Elsewhere in the same essay Mr. Bradley undertakes to deny that there are or can be multiple relations. "Between," he says, "is no relation at all"; it is "a feature which appears in a relational arrangement"; for which the equivalent phrase, "arrangement involving such and such relations," is also used (pp. 306–7). Now I venture to say that Mr. Bradley would find it embarrassing to try to point out the several relations which to his mind make up the arrangement of "between." For the statement that *B* is between *A* and *C* can not be resolved into any number of statements with regard to *A* and *B*, *B* and *C*, and *A* and *C*.

Turning to the constructive papers, we find the reading of them much facilitated by the few pages of "Concluding Remarks," in which Mr. Bradley gives a summary account of his view as to ultimate reality. The "very soul" of this view, he says, is "its insistence and emphasis on an all-pervasive relativism"; and he opposes it to the false absolutism, which "takes some distinction within the whole and asserts it as being real by itself and unconditionally; and then from this misconceived ground . . . goes on to deny or to belittle other complementary aspects of the same whole." And he makes clear that it is this general view that has inspired all that he has written upon the various special topics treated.

The principle of universal relativism, used as an engine of criticism, is most formidable; and Mr. Bradley employs it here, as in his earlier works, with unrivaled skill. But, so far as any positive aid in the solution of any special philosophical problems is concerned, it leaves one pretty close to where it finds one. All that is denied as substance is reasserted as mode. "Everything," as Mr. Bradley says, "is justified as being real in its own sphere and degree." But the sphere and degree remain to be determined; and here Mr. Bradley has not much assistance to offer us.

For it is amazing how little knowledge of nature or society enters into this philosophy; except, indeed, indirectly, for it operates by means of conceptions which the German idealists won from the science of their time. Mr. Bradley disclaims any knowledge of mathematics; and of all his reading of science and history and general literature, and of all his observations upon men and manners, almost nothing appears in these pages. He is—with all due respect be it said—a typical scholastic. It is for this reason that, while he is a great man in his school, and has had a powerful influence upon thinkers who stand upon the same general platform, outside the school his teachings have left a very slight impression.

Mr. Bradley's Hegelianism differs from that of Hegel first and foremost in its relatively unsystematic character; and this rests upon the merely negative use of the principle of the dialectic. Nothing that can not without contradiction be conceived as self-subsistent is real; and nothing to which this test is applied survives it. But there is generally no effective synthesis—only the postulate that *somehow* a synthesis must be provided. Mr. Bradley's philosophy is, accordingly, far less ambitious

than Hegel's, and is wholly free from the tendency to charlatanism into which Hegel's ambitious programme sometimes betrayed him. But it is at the same time far less instructive.

Along with this renunciation of system goes a certain empiricistic strain. I have already referred to Mr. Bradley's use of what he calls "ideal experiments." These play a great part in his thinking. Estimates of the value of this method must differ greatly. To me it appears open to deep suspicion. A similar procedure on the part of Herbert Spencer, when he attested the "inconceivability of the opposite" of various self-evident truths, is universally condemned as a mere appeal to prejudice; and I can not see that Mr. Bradley's ideal experiments are so hedged about by experimental safeguards as to be of a distinctly higher value.

Another *motif* that may be regarded as empiricistic (or, perhaps, rather subjectivistic) is the basing of epistemology upon a specific theoretical impulse, which is treated simply as a given characteristic of human nature, correlative with various other impulses such as the esthetic, religious, and moral. This subjective treatment of truth is combined by Mr. Bradley with an objective treatment, more in keeping (as I should suppose) with the spirit of absolute idealism; but, so far as I can see, no organic connection between the two treatments is made out.

Similarly, as regards the real, as distinguished from the imaginary world, Mr. Bradley declares that it "rests on a quality, on a felt content, on that of which I am aware when I say 'this myself which is now.' I experience this content when I feel the difference between the mere idea and the actuality of my present self." In the same connection this is called a "felt unique quality"—Hume himself is not more ready to assume unique feelings—"a content not explicit, but positive, not brought before me, but felt." And again this view is conjoined with an objective view. The hard and fast distinction, based on the felt unique quality, will not stand, we are told. It must be replaced by a difference of degree, based on the relative orderliness and systematic character of the various worlds offering themselves to our attention (pp. 47 ff.).

As to the value of Mr. Bradley's philosophy as a whole, it remains to the future to speak. But, so far as I can see, this value has lain not nearly so much in the specific theories advanced as in the incessant intellectual activity of the philosopher. In the preface to this volume he very gracefully remarks: "It is a satisfaction to me, when approaching the end of my own career, to note (whatever school or tendency may from time to time be in fashion) the increasing devotion amongst us to metaphysical inquiry." Of such devotion Mr. Bradley has himself given a noble example, which has no doubt had its part in bringing about the general revival. To be sure he has never reached the larger public; and he has scarcely touched even the philosophical public in France and Germany. But, especially since the publication of "Appearance and Reality," every thinker in England and America has had to take serious account of him; and this has meant hard study of a hard-thinking man. I do not know where one could find less entertainment. No art is employed to fix a wandering attention. The reading of Mr. Bradley's works has required

and fostered a spirit like that which went into the writing of them: a single-minded devotion to philosophy.

Mr. Bradley half promises to collect some of his other writings which have too long lain scattered through the reviews, and suggests that he may even republish his early volumes on logic and ethics. Let us hope that strength will not be lacking to him to finish this task.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

Moral Training in the School and Home: A Manual for Teachers and Parents. E. HERSHEY SNEATH and GEORGE HODGES. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 221.

The Way to the Heart of the Pupil. DR. HERMAN WEIMER. Authorized translation by J. REMSEN BISHOP and ADOLPH NIEDERPRUEM. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xii + 178.

The two books demand separate treatment. The first-named is the work of two American professors of divinity, written to meet the posited need for "careful, systematic, graded, moral training" in the American public elementary school. The book is thoroughly inane. The contents consist of (i) an obvious list of virtues and vices, (ii) commonplace commentary thereon, and (iii) tables of suggested stories classified according to the several virtues and vices of the several school grades. The stories constitute the primary motive of the book, for we are told explicitly that "the best way" to build character is "by systematically placing before the student moral situations as embodied in story." No one questions a crying need for better morals, nor that character-building lies centrally within the domain of education. But when we are asked to rely principally upon stories as the specific educational agency that shall effect better moral characters, we hesitate. We are forced to wonder whether the advocates of such a nostrum quite appreciate the inherent position that morals have in life. Nor is there any firmer grasp of the principles of habit formation: "Moral situations embodied in story . . . dealing with the virtues and vices peculiar to each period of the child's unfolding result in wholesome moral reactions which, through frequent repetition, lead the pupil to develop habits of will and forms of conduct that are morally worthy." What can the authors be thinking? Has James lived in vain? Is conduct merely the end of education and not also its very process and content? Are actual life and the study of psychology still strangers to each other? We need say no more. A vital discussion of the actual problem of moral education would be welcomed; but there is no place for a book based essentially on such an inadequate and discarded psychology.

Except as source material for the study of comparative education, the second book—as a translation—has small excuse for being. Its lesson for America is too remote. The chief interest which it has for us lies in the light it reflects upon German school practise. The appeal to Pestalozzi's love of children, the protest against corporal punishment, against brow-

beating, against refusal to answer pupil's questions—all this carries us back to the mid-nineteenth century, and shows us how far American schools under the influence of democracy have departed from the once universal repression of childhood. When Dr. Weimer regrets that "kindness is so rare a plant in our schools," that too often "the child is absorbed in silent, half-conscious hatred of everything that is called school," we see in these effects of "Prussian preciseness"—to use Dr. Weimer's phrase—not the much-praised efficiency of German education, but a general social theory and attitude which consistently refuses self-expression to German school-boys, and to their elders a responsible ministry in the Reichstag. America has much to regret as to the efficiency of her schools, but she has left behind the rule of the rod and the systematic suppression of childhood. Her undertaking is difficult, but it is the problem of democracy. We wish Dr. Weimer Godspeed in his crusade for happier schoolrooms, but many of us fear that another reform must first be effected.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. February–March, 1915. *Freud and His School: New Paths of Psychology* (pp. 369–384): A. W. VAN RENTERGHEM. – The first of two or more articles on the work of Freud and his school. The attitude of societies and the public when Freud first published his works on psychoanalysis is briefly sketched. The difficulty of giving "a concise, clear, and understanding idea of Freud's teachings" is due to the various subdivisions being so involved. The conception of the conditions of the patients cited might be called "the sexual theory of the neurosis." *On Psychological Understanding* (pp. 385–399): DR. C. G. JUNG. – One kind of understanding is *retrospective*, another is not analytic or reductive, but *synthetic* or *constructive*. "The reductive method has the great advantage of being much simpler. It reduces everything to generally known principles of a simple nature. The constructive method has to build up towards an unknown goal. The elements with which it works are the complicated components of the actual mind. This kind of work forces the explorer to take all those powers, which are at work in a human mind, into his account. The reductive method tries to replace the religious and philosophical needs of mankind by a more elementary viewpoint, following the principle of the 'nothing but,' as James nicely says; but the constructive method acknowledges them *'tel quel'* and considers them as the indispensable elements of its work." *Professor Janet on Psychoanalysis: A Rejoinder* (pp. 400–410): ERNEST JONES. – Professor Janet's criticism of psychoanalysis, read before the International Congress in London, contained a number of passages of a nature that laid him open to a charge of unfairness. His answer was an

apology of his ignorance of German and consequent reliance on French and American abstracts of Freud's articles. "Even if his plea of ignorance at the time of writing the paper afforded the real explanation of these, and I shall presently show that it could not have done so, it is evident that after the date of the Congress this could no longer be regarded as a valid excuse. . . . Professor Janet has, in my opinion, allowed himself to be betrayed into the grossest lack of objectivity." *Freudian Psychology and Psychical Research: A Rejoinder* (pp. 411–416): HEREWARD CARRINGTON. – Ten statements made by Dr. Leonard T. Troland in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* are attacked as an "attempt to account for the supernormal phenomena of psychical research by means of Freudian analysis is of course, sheer nonsense." *Stammering as a Psychoneurosis* (pp. 417–429): ISADOR H. CORIAT. – The cases investigated and treated by the psychoanalytic method have led to the belief that the disturbing mechanism is mental and not physical. "The proper treatment of stammering, therefore, is purely psychological, for it is useless to teach the sufferer *how* to speak, because under certain circumstances the stammerer experiences no difficulty in speaking." *Discussion. Reviews: Stammering and Cognate Defects of Speech:* C. S. BLUEMEL. *What Men Live By: Work, Play, Love, and Worship:* RICHARD C. CABOT. *A Handbook of Psychology and Mental Diseases:* C. B. BURR. *Books Received.*

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Bruce, H. Addington. Psychology and Parenthood. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company. 1915. Pp. ix + 293.

Finnbogason, Gudmundur. L'intelligence sympathique. Traduit par André Courmont. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1913. Pp. 239.

Gentile, Giovanni. Studi Vichiani. Messina: Guiseppe Principato. 1915. Pp. 458.

Merz, Theodore. History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Vol. IV. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1914. Pp. xii + 825.

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beating, against refusal to answer pupil's questions—all this carries us back to the mid-nineteenth century, and shows us how far American schools under the influence of democracy have departed from the once universal repression of childhood. When Dr. Weimer regrets that "kindness is so rare a plant in our schools," that too often "the child is absorbed in silent, half-conscious hatred of everything that is called school," we see in these effects of "Prussian preciseness"—to use Dr. Weimer's phrase—not the much-praised efficiency of German education, but a general social theory and attitude which consistently refuses self-expression to German school-boys, and to their elders a responsible ministry in the Reichstag. America has much to regret as to the efficiency of her schools, but she has left behind the rule of the rod and the systematic suppression of childhood. Her undertaking is difficult, but it is the problem of democracy. We wish Dr. Weimer Godspeed in his crusade for happier schoolrooms, but many of us fear that another reform must first be effected.

WILLIAM HEARD KILPATRICK.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. February–March, 1915. *Freud and His School: New Paths of Psychology* (pp. 369–384): A. W. VAN RENTERGHEM. – The first of two or more articles on the work of Freud and his school. The attitude of societies and the public when Freud first published his works on psychoanalysis is briefly sketched. The difficulty of giving "a concise, clear, and understanding idea of Freud's teachings" is due to the various subdivisions being so involved. The conception of the conditions of the patients cited might be called "the sexual theory of the neurosis." *On Psychological Understanding* (pp. 385–399): DR. C. G. JUNG. – One kind of understanding is *retrospective*, another is not analytic or reductive, but *synthetic* or *constructive*. "The reductive method has the great advantage of being much simpler. It reduces everything to generally known principles of a simple nature. The constructive method has to build up towards an unknown goal. The elements with which it works are the complicated components of the actual mind. This kind of work forces the explorer to take all those powers, which are at work in a human mind, into his account. The reductive method tries to replace the religious and philosophical needs of mankind by a more elementary viewpoint, following the principle of the 'nothing but,' as James nicely says; but the constructive method acknowledges them *'tel quel'* and considers them as the indispensable elements of its work." *Professor Janet on Psychoanalysis: A Rejoinder* (pp. 400–410): ERNEST JONES. – Professor Janet's criticism of psychoanalysis, read before the International Congress in London, contained a number of passages of a nature that laid him open to a charge of unfairness. His answer was an

apology of his ignorance of German and consequent reliance on French and American abstracts of Freud's articles. "Even if his plea of ignorance at the time of writing the paper afforded the real explanation of these, and I shall presently show that it could not have done so, it is evident that after the date of the Congress this could no longer be regarded as a valid excuse. . . . Professor Janet has, in my opinion, allowed himself to be betrayed into the grossest lack of objectivity." *Freudian Psychology and Psychical Research: A Rejoinder* (pp. 411–416): HEREWARD CARRINGTON. – Ten statements made by Dr. Leonard T. Troland in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* are attacked as an "attempt to account for the supernormal phenomena of psychical research by means of Freudian analysis is of course, sheer nonsense." *Stammering as a Psychoneurosis* (pp. 417–429): ISADOR H. CORIAT. – The cases investigated and treated by the psychoanalytic method have led to the belief that the disturbing mechanism is mental and not physical. "The proper treatment of stammering, therefore, is purely psychological, for it is useless to teach the sufferer *how* to speak, because under certain circumstances the stammerer experiences no difficulty in speaking." *Discussion. Reviews: Stammering and Cognate Defects of Speech:* C. S. BLUEMEL. *What Men Live By: Work, Play, Love, and Worship:* RICHARD C. CABOT. *A Handbook of Psychology and Mental Diseases:* C. B. BURR. *Books Received.*

Braunshaufen, N. Einführung in die experimentelle Psychologie. Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, Band 484. Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner. 1915. Pp. 111. 1.25 M.

Bruce, H. Addington. Psychology and Parenthood. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company. 1915. Pp. ix + 293.

Finnbogason, Gudmundur. L'intelligence sympathique. Traduit par André Courmont. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1913. Pp. 239.

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NOTES AND NEWS

At a meeting of the Aristotelian Society on May 3, Professor Arthur Robinson read a paper on "The Philosophy of Maine de Biran: the Way out of Sensationalism." "De Biran was a life-guardsman of Louis XVI., banished to solitude by the Revolution, who devoted his life to philosophy. Although the period in which he lived witnessed the beginning and development of the great philosophical movement in Europe inaugurated by Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' De Biran began his work probably not knowing even the name of Kant, and regarding Condillac and the ideologists as the whole of philosophy. The attention which has recently been drawn to his work is due not to a purely antiquarian interest, but to the value and suggestiveness of his writings. It has been claimed that there is a close kinship between the philosophy of De Biran and that of Bergson; it is no doubt a kinship of the spirit rather than of the letter, but there are some who see in his doctrines the beginning of a philosophical direction which has influenced first Ravaisson and finally Bergson. In the only work published during his lifetime, his "Mémoire sur l'Habitude," he comes before us as a sincere and subtle thinker, a psychologist by constitution, an ideologist and disciple of Condillac, gradually reasoning himself out of Sensationalism under the guidance of a clue found in the authorities of that school, but never pursued by them. Condillac's psychology was an attempt to reduce all the contents of consciousness, and also its activity, to transformations of passive sensations. Memory is a weakened attention, a dominant sensation, and to have two sensations at the same time is to compare and judge. So, in his famous statue, the senses are awakened one after the other, and then the intellectual faculties supervene upon —or rather are—the transformed sensations. Some of Condillac's followers have called attention to the part which mobility plays in experience, but it was De Biran who followed out the conception until it led him to conclusions inconsistent with the whole theory of Sensationalism. Some of his theories were in a curious way a forecast of modern doctrines, as, for instance, that we labor under an illusion with regard to the reality actually within us, born of our tendency to objectify and represent what is incapable of being objectified and represented, and the task of philosophy is to overcome and reverse this tendency. '*Il faut, pour ainsi dire, désobjectiver la conscience et l'apercevoir dans son intimité.*' 'Who knows,' he says in another connection, 'all that is possible to concentrated reflection, and whether there may not be a new world within us to be discovered one day by some metaphysical Columbus?'"—*Athenæum.*

"The Layman Revato," by Edward P. Buffet, which was reviewed in these columns on May 27, is now handled commercially, not by the publisher whose imprint it bears, but by Messrs. G. E. Stechert and Company, 151 West 25th Street, New York City, as selling agents for the author. Mr. Buffet's address is 804 Bergen Avenue, Jersey City, New Jersey.

Dr. Ernst Meumann, professor of psychology at Hamburg, known for his contributions to experimental and educational psychology, has died at the age of fifty-three years.